What “it” is about: The implicit in Virginia Woolf’s short fictions by Besnault-Levita, Anne
 Journal of the Short Story in English
Les Cahiers de la nouvelle 
40 | Spring 2003
The implicit in the short story in English









Date of publication: 1 March 2003




Anne Besnault-Levita, « What “it” is about: The implicit in Virginia Woolf’s short ﬁctions », Journal of the
Short Story in English [Online], 40 | Spring 2003, Online since 29 July 2008, connection on 14 November
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/jsse/300 
This text was automatically generated on 14 November 2019.
© All rights reserved
What “it” is about: The implicit in
Virginia Woolf’s short fictions
Anne Besnault-Levita
1 How does “it” mean, what is “it” about and what does “it” reveal about the ethics of
Virginia Woolf’s poetics of the implicit, and therefore of fiction, are the three questions I
would like to raise in this paper. My starting point will be the recurring use, in many
short stories, of the indefinite pronoun “it”, that haunting black mark on the white wall
of the texts whose metalinguistic function challenges some of our common assumptions
about the implicit as a linguistic and literary concept. In other words, I would like to
examine the implicit theories of meaning and interpretation behind the implicit as they
are put to the test by Woolf’s fictional prose. 
2 On first consideration, the use of the pronoun “it” in Virginia Woolf’s short fictions has
nothing to do with the notions of linguistic presupposition, cultural presupposition or
pragmatic implicatures, nor does it seem to refer to the common definition of the implicit
as what is suggested or understood without being stated directly. As a pronoun replacing
a noun or referring to a clause, “it” first seems to call for our knowledge of language as a
code and designates language as explicit. “Ah, the mark on the wall! It was a snail”, the
narrator of Woolf’s famous short story concludes in an anti-climactic moment deflating
the reader’s expectations as to the nature of that “small round mark, black upon the
white  wall,  about  six  or  seven inches  above  the  mantelpiece”  described  in  the  first
paragraph1. In what clearly reads as an ironical punch-line, “it” first anaphorically refers
to the mark before cataphorically providing us with a definition — “it was a snail” —
which puts an end to the thematic and imagistic meditation that it had triggered off in
the first place. The deceived reader is left with the feeling that the linguistic and literary
explicitness attached to the use ot “it” is frustrating. But the “judicious” reader will reject
explicitness  as  the  implicit  of  the  text  to  turn to  implicitness  as  its  essential  mode:
realizing that the mark’s definition as a snail is some kind of reading lure, he will have to
build up an interpretation of this short story insisting on the unsaid — this pattern of
hidden, not-yet actualized signifieds — as one of its fundamental dimensions.
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3 Thus,  he may choose to read “The Mark on the Wall” as a fictional essay promoting
Woolf’s art of fiction as an encounter with “life itself”2. In this case he will foreground the
text’s implicit meditation on the problems of representation, a meditation opposing facts
to fancy (the mark is a snail, yet “it is not the actual sight or sound that matters, but the
reverberations that it makes as it travels through our minds”3), comparing the Edwardian
interest for “the surface with its hard separate facts” (85) with the modernist awareness
that a mirror never hides “one reflection but an almost infinite number” (85), contrasting
the hierarchical and even patriarchical order of what Woolf calls in this same story the
“Whitaker’s  Table  of  Precedency”  (86)  with  the  infinite  richness  of  humanity  as
metaphorized not by the definition of the mark as a snail but by its potentially unstable
nature as a referent. In the light of modernism’s acknowledged self-reflexiveness and
rejection of univocal determination of meaning, the reader may also conceive the story as
the expression of a syntagmatic movement taking him from the illusion of significance as
transparent  and  stable  (the  mark  is  a  snail)  to  the  revelation  of  signification  as  a
paradigmatic process implying plurality and instability: “The outward sign I see and shall
see  for  ever;  but  at  the  meaning of  it  I  shall  only  guess”4.  Inspired  by  a  more
phenomenological approach of interpretation positing the impossibility of our gaining a
knowledge of the world that would remain untouched by our perception of that world, he
could also probably insist on the definition “it” implicitly conveys of sight as insight, of
vision  as  an  envisioning  process:  objects  are  always  the  incomplete  objects  of  our
subjective perception. Now a post-modernist, if not deconstructionist, interpretation of
“The Mark on the Wall” would surely underline the absence of any stabilized signified
attached to “it” together with the endless circulation of unstable signifiers imparting a
strong sense of the unpresentable, of the absence of a “beyond-the-text” since, indeed,
“No, no nothing is proved, nothing is known. […] Everything’s moving, falling, slipping,
vanishing…” (87-89).
4 Whatever  the  different  and  yet  non-exclusive  interpretations,  the  various  signifieds
explicitly referred to by the signifier “it” — “mark”, “object”, “hole”, “nail”, “snail” — all
point to an implicit dimension of the text which no longer designates language as an
explicit and stable code or the text as an easily deciphered riddle. In other words, Woolf’s
use of the implicit here implies a poetical order that should be opposed to the traditional
grammatical order of language, but also to the rhetorical or pragmatic order of meaning
and interpretation when the theoretical injunctions implied by those orders amount to
what  Jean-Jacques  Lecercle,  in  Interpretation  as  Pragmatics,  calls  a  “doxic”  theory  of
interpretation and meaning5. Thus, according to what could be called the metaphysical
order of traditional grammar6, one of those injunctions is that as a mode of grammatical
ellipsis the implicit entails that 1) an elliptic sentence refers to a complete sentence 2)
what is implied is always perceptible 3) the missing words define a negative form of
utterance: they unmistakably refer to the intention of the speaking subject, although in a
negative way. Indisputably, the way “it” works in Virginia Woolf’s short fictions offers an
implicit theory of language and meaning that challenges those three theoretical maxims.
First and foremost, the implicit is not for Woolf a secundary phenomenon which does not,
or should not,  disrupt the transparency of  language as its  primary quality.  As Woolf
herself explains in an essay called “Craftsmanship” dealing with the art of fiction but also
with language as a conversational tool, words always “mislead us”, “fool us ”; they never
express “one simple statement but a thousand possibilities”. The “useful meaning” of
words is not, as the final line of “The Mark on the Wall” suggests, their “literal meaning”,
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their “surface meaning”. The proper way to use them is by relying on their “power of
suggestion which is one of [their] most mysterious properties”. “Words, English words”,
Woolf goes on explaining, “are full of echoes, of memories, of associations — naturally”7.
Not only does Woolf suggest here that the implicit dimension of words — the natural
vagueness  and undecidability  of  language — comes first;  she  also  reverses  the  usual
hierarchy of traditional grammar and of traditional rhetorics and pragmatics according
to which the implicit presupposes the existence of explicit semantic contents to which it
refers as an origin. As the short story entitled “Solid Objects” suggests, the search for
such an origin (whether it be of an object or of a word) is impossible, and this is partly
why what is implied is not always perceptible and does not refer to any complete and
originally intended form of utterance:
It was a lump of a glass, so thick as to be almost opaque; the smoothing of the sea
had completely worn off any edge or shape, so it was impossible to say whether it
had been bottle, tumbler or window-pane; it was nothing but glass; it was almost a
precious stone. You had only to enclose it in a rim of gold, or pierce it with a wire,
and it  became a  jewel;  part  of  a  necklace,  or  a  dull  green light  upon a  finger.
Perhaps after all it was really a gem; […]. (103)
5 In this short story, the way “it” cataphorically fails to provide us with a definition before
retrospectively referring to an impossible quest for truth — “’What was the truth of it,
John?’ asked Charles suddenly, turning and facing him. ‘What made you give it up like
that all in a second?’” (106) — is exemplary and echoes our analysis of “Mark on the
Wall”. But although truth (the implicit signified attached to the signifier “it” under which
all the others are subsumed in this text and in Woolf’s short fiction in general) is most of
the time conveyed metaphorically, it cannot be approached either through traditional
rhetorics  when  based  on  a  definition  of  the  rhetorical  figure  as  transparent  and
“translatable”8. In this respect, Oswald Ducrot is right to argue that the conception of
language as a code, and of rhetorics as a set of conventional categories always finally
turning indirect meaning into explicit meaning is incompatible with the very notion of
the implicit9. The resurgence of the grammatical order of language (as defined above) in
such a conception of the rhetorical order of language is obvious: it implies a positivistic
account  of  sense  based  on  the  reductive  opposition  between  literal  and  figurative
meaning and argues  for  the  view that  literary  interpretation is  a  disclosure  process
implying closure in the first place.10
6 Interestingly  enough,  Virginia  Woolf’s  use  of  the  implicit  challenges  this  view  by
systematically resorting to connotation at the expense of denotation, as if there could be
no such thing as denoted meaning. Linguistically and literarily speaking, the mark on the
wall  is  not a snail  but a mark on a wall:  just as “solid objects” are solid (i.e.  clearly
identifiable) in appearance only, it has no significance outside a discursive context. This
is why Woolf’s short fictions constantly blurr our usual perception of the line between
literal meaning and figurative meaning, between denotation and connotation, between
the alleged transparency of the code and the alleged opacity of literature. As Jean-Jacques
Lecercle points out in an essay entitled “L’écriture féminine selon Virginia Woolf”, the
“philosophy  of  the  implicit”  in  “the  feminine  sentence”  according  to  Woolf  can  be
described in the terms of various theories of sense and discourse (he mentions Derrida,
Lyotard and Deleuze), but whatever the mode of theorizing, the Woolfian truth cannot be
characterized by a normative and straightforward use of “designation, signification and
manifestation”11. Not so much because it is ultimately inaccessible or “beyond the text”,
as  because  it  always  exceeds  ready-coded  motifs,  whether  narrative  or  semiotic.  In
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Woolf’s short fictions, what we take for an explicit signifiance always-already implies the
underdetermination of language as an implicit dimension, which accounts for the way the
use of the pronoun “it” follows a circular movement from the implicit to the explicit and
back again to the implicit: “But was it ‘happiness’?” the narrator wonders in “Happiness”
(178). “How could she express it?” the character-focalizer asks in “A Woman’s College
from Outside” (147). In both examples, “it” anaphorically refers to an implicit utterance
which  is  cataphorically  turned  into  an  explicit  signified  —  “happiness”,  “life”,  “the
world”  —  before  losing  its  explicitness  through  a  process  of  metaphorization  that
reminds one of Gertrude Stein’s conception of the use of names12:
A name is adequate or it is not. If it is adequate why go on calling it, if it is not, then
calling it by its name does no good. If you feel what is inside of a thing do not call it
by the name by which it is known.
7 “Names”, “big words” as Woolf puts it, do not seem to fit “it”: “No. The big word did not
seem to fit it [Happiness], did not seem to refer to this state of being curled in rosy flakes
around a bright light” (178). “Big” words frozen by canonical significations, by semantic
and cultural  recognitions  always  fail  in  their  attempt  to  hide the opacity  of  natural
language behind an illusory correspondence between signifiers  and signifieds,  figural
meaning and literal meaning:
How could she express it — that after the dark churning of myriad ages here was
light at the end of the tunnel;  life;  the world. Beneath her it lay — all good; all
lovable. Such was her discovery. (147)
8 In Virginia Woolf’s short fiction, light is life is the world is truth is light. The meaning
hidden behind “it”, the desired epiphanic disclosure of the text, cannot but be delayed,
differred and differring, Derrida would say, questioned, rendered implicit, just as the idea
of a formal centre of signification releasing knowledge is itself disrupted and replaced by
an infinite reserve of signifiers and therefore of “possibilities”, “echoes, memories [and]
associations”:
Desiring truth, awaiting it, laboriously distilling a few words, forever desiring — (a
cry starts to the left, another to the right. Wheels strike divergently. Omnibuses
conglomerate in conflict) — forever desiring — (the clock asseverates with twelve
distinct strokes that it is midday; light sheds gold scales, children swarm) — forever
desiring truth.13
9 To understand how “it”  means and what  it  is  about  therefore requires  more than a
positivistic account of meaning as intention and recognition. In this respect, even the
traditional (Jean-Jacques Lecercle would say “doxic”) pragmatic view of sense does not
seem to “fit it”. If Woolf would surely agree that “the interpretation of a text can be
treated  as  an  extended speech act”14,  it  seems  to  me that  she  would  reject  Searle’s
conception of meaning as intentionality (at least, her fiction does) according to which
“everything  that  can  be  meant  can  be  said”15,  just  as  she  would  challenge  Oswald’s
Ducrot’s view that implicit meaning is always added on to literal meaning which it never
completely erases16: “In reading we have to allow the sunken meanings to remain sunken,
suggested, not stated; lapsing and pouring into each other like reeds on the bed of a
river”17. Here again, Woolf reminds us that indirect language acts based on the use of the
implicit are not secundary phenomenons. In a discursive context, the implicit has to be
interpreted and constructed, not simply retrieved and re-constructed. In fact, what “it” is
about in Virginia Woolf’s short fictions cannot be recognized or disclosed since the modes
of the implicit that “it” activates require a theory of interpretation which does not imply
that signification comes prior to utterance.  In this respect,  the way the conventional
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motif  of  the quest  in some of  Woolf’s  famous stories  (“The Mark on the Wall”,  “An
Unwritten Novel“, “A Haunted House”, “Monday or Tuesday” or “The Lady in the Looking
Glass”) may lure the reader into a hermeneutic pattern of interpretation is a remarkable
example  of  Woolf’s  subversive  strategy,  as  the  quest  motif  appears  to  orientate  the
writing and the reading of those texts towards the disclosure of an origin that was finally
never there and therefore never lost18. 
10 “A Haunted House” is here another canonical example of the way Woolf prompts us to
look at “it” as a successful, yet finally absent, centre on which the overall meaning of the
story deceptively depends: 
Whatever hour you woke there was a door shutting. From room to room they went,
hand in hand, lifting here, opening there, making sure — a ghostly couple.
‘Here  we left  it,’  she  said. And he added,’  ‘Oh,  but here  too!’  ‘It’s  upstairs,’  she
murmured, ‘And in the garden,’ he whispered. ‘Quietly,’ they said, ‘or we shall wake
them.’19
11 The resort to cultural implicatures in the form of an intertextual allusion is the first mode
of the implicit in this story whose title builds up a deceptive horizon of expectation for
the  “common reader”.  The  convention of  the  gothic  tale  invites  us  to  embark on a
syntagmatic journey taking us from sheer absence — there is no object after the verbs “to
lift”  and “to open” — to the loss  of  the referent  attached to “it”  — to a discovered
treasure — “the treasure yours” (123) — to the metaphoric unveiling of the treasure’s
significance: “Waking, I cry ‘Oh, is this your buried treasure, The light in the heart.’”
(123). However, the disclosure of the metaphorical meaning of the story’s “lost” referent
does not entail a recognition of its lost signified although it takes place in an epiphanic
moment, announced in the rest of the passage by the shift from obscurity to light, from
the past tense to the present tense. The metaphorical implicitness of the “revelation”
rather challenges the traditional pattern of the quest by taking us back to the beginning
of  the short  story rather than to a  lost  origin of  utterance and meaning.  What that
obviously rapid hermeneutic analysis does not account for, among other things, is the
passage from the pronoun “they” — “from room to room they went” — to the pronoun “I”
in the last sentence of the text. Just as there cannot but be an unbridgeable gap between
utterer’s  meaning  and  utterance  meaning,  between  utterance  meaning  and
interpretation, what ‘I” has discovered may not be what “they” have been looking for.
What “it” is about is therefore not merely the infinite reserve of textual meaning; “it” is a
blunt reminder of the uncontrollable implicit dimension of natural and literary language
(Woolf never seems to consider literariness as a form of disruption of ordinary language
or  communication),  which  entails  that  authorial  meaning  is  a  partly  irretrievable
intention  and  that  literary  interpretation  is  necessarily  a  praxis,  an  “intervention”
depending on a situation of enunciation and on the “determinate limits” imposed by any
literary text20. 
12 I  would also argue that for Woolf,  it  is  that uncontrollable implicit  dimension which
renders  human intercourse  interesting  and  intense,  however  irrational,  obscure  and
meaningless it may sometimes appear to be:
Of all things, nothing is so strange as human intercourse, she thought, because of
its changes, its extraordinary irrationality, her dislike being now nothing short of
the most intense and rapturous love, but directly the word ‘love’ occurred to her,
she rejected it, thinking again how obscure the mind was, with its very few words
for  all  these  astonishing  perceptions,  these  alternations  of  pain  and  pleasure.
(“Together and Apart”, 193)
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‘Yet how sad a thing is sense! How vast a renunciation it represents! Listen for a
moment. Distinguish one among the voices. Now. “So cold it must seem after India.
Seven years too. But habit is everything.” That’s sense. That’s agreement. They’ve
fixed their eyes upon something visible to each of them. They attempt no more to
look upon the little spark of light, the little purple shadow which may be fruitful
land on  the  verge  of  the  horizon,  or  only  a  flying  gleam on the  water.  It’s  all
compromise — all safety, the general intercourse of human beings. Therefore we
discover nothing; we cease to explore; we cease to believe that there is anything to
discover. “Nonsense” you say; meaning that I shan’t see your crystal globe; and I’m
half ashamed to try.’
‘Speech is an old torn net, through which the fish escape as one casts it over them.
Perhaps silence is better. Let us try it. Come to the window.’ 
‘It’s  an  odd  thing,  silence.  The  mind  becomes  like  a  starless  night;  and  then  a
meteor  slides,  splendid,  right  across  the  dark  and  is  extinct.  We  never  give
sufficient thanks for this entertainment. (“The Evening Party”, 99)
13 My own reading, or “praxis” of those two extracts thus makes me aware that silence,
which within the modernist literary context, is often endowed with a symbolic power of
attractiveness, should not be here opposed to conversation or dialogue, but to sense as
“habit”,  “agreement”,  “compromise”,  “safety”.  What is  valuable for Woolf  in “human
intercourse” is  neither silence as an ideal  form of  communication (although such an
“entertainment” might seem attractive at times) nor an impossible cooperative principle
between speaker and hearer, author and reader, based on the non-proliferation of the
implicit. I do not think that her characters grieve here for the loss of dialogic directness
or for a prelapsarian linguistic world: natural languages would sink into the plenitude of
fixed meaning if the implicit was not a fundamental linguistic category. No “discovery”
would be possible, no “spark of light” would “slide” across the dark sky if there was no
“little purple shadow which may be fruitful land on the verge of the horizon”. As a highly
political  discursive mode,  the  implicit  in  Virginia  Woolf’s  short  fictions  is  thus
inseparable from the concepts of  history and society,  which imply the acceptance of
change, obscurity and disagreement and a distrust of “fixed” and “visible” meaning; it is
inseparable from the complex and ambivalent process of  subjectivation that involves
both speakers and hearers, authors and readers. To take up B. C. Rosenberg’s words in his
analysis of the Woolfian notion of “common reader”, there is a parallel between Woolf’s
poetics  and  her  conception  of  conversation  and  dialogue:  “dialogue,  as  a  model  for
constructing  knowledge,  is  not  fluid  or  static,  but  fluid,  decentered,  and  process-
orientated.  Like  the  common reader,  dialogue is  anti-authoritarian and non-didactic,
unsystematic and constantly changing with each interaction […]21. If we agree that there
are ethical implications in the way literary theory articulates the problem of how, as
speaking subjects, we take into account the existence of others22, then the question of the
ethics of Virginia Woolf’s poetics of the implicit cannot but appear to be linked with the
exploration of alterity “it” stands for:
I have some restless searcher in me. Why is there not a discovery in life? Something
one can lay hands on and say ‘This is it’? My depression is a harassed feeling. I’m
looking: but that’s not it — that’s not it. What is it? And shall I die before I find it?23
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interpretation and its seven maxims: Maxim n° 1: “the transparency of the text”; Maxim n° 2:
“the fixity of meaning”; Maxim n° 3: “the intendedness, or intentionality of meaning”; Maxim n°
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it  is  the  aim  of  interpretation  to  recapture”);  Maxim  n°  7:  “interpretation  involves  textual
exchange and dialogue” and this dialogue is “resolutely irenic” (43-45).
6.  In an essay entitled « Ellipse et présupposition » (Poétique (44),  nov. 1980, 422-437,) Marie-
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avait présidé à la formation des langues” (Batteux, Nouvel Examen du préjugé sur l’inversion, 1767,
cité par M.-T Ligot, 425). 
7.  V. Woolf,  “Craftsmanship” (1937),  The Death of  the Moth and Other Essays (1942),  San Diego,
London, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1970, 198-204.
8.  G. Genette, Figures, Paris: Seuil, 1960, 209: “Toute figure est traduisible, et porte sa traduction,
visible, en transparence, comme un filigrane, ou un palimpseste, sous son texte apparent.”
9.  O. Ducrot, Dire et ne pas dire : principes de sémantique linguistique, Paris : Hermann, 1991, 18-21:
“la rhétorique connotative [s’appuie sur] un code connotatif qui attache directement à chaque
énonciation l’ensemble des significations implicites qui nous semblait d’abord lié à elle par une
démarche  discursive.  […]  Cette  rhétorique  instaure  un  nouveau  code  qui  finit  par  expliciter
l’implicite.”
10.  In « La Parole hantée: épistémologie linguistique de l’ellipse » (« Ellipses, blanc, silences ».
Actes  du  colloque  du  CICADA,  6-7-8  déc.  1990.,  Presses  Universitaires  de  Pau,  1992),  Gérard
Dessons explores the linguistic epistemology of ellipsis as a rhetorical figure and points out this
convergence of the two orders of language and meaning: “Dans [le cadre de la rhétorique de
l’écart], l’ellipse suppose […] que la phrase elliptique renvoie à une phrase pleine, […] que les
mots sous-entendus sont perceptibles […] que les mots manquants définissent une énonciation
négative” (15).
11.  J.-J. Lecercle, “L’écriture féminine selon Virginia Woolf”, Études Britanniques Contemporaines,
Octobre 1999, 26.
12.  G. Stein, “Poetry and Grammar”, in P. Meyerowitz (ed.), Look at Me Now and Here I Am: Writings
and Lectures — 1909-1945 (1967), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984, 125-126.
13.   “Monday or Tuesday”, 137.
14.  J.-J. Lecercle, Interpretation as pragmatics…, 34. Lecercle’s pragmatic theory of interpretation
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reference”)  which  has  the  same  consequences  as  the  previous  one;  3)  the  maxim  of
recontextualisation (“meaning,  far  from  being  changeless,  is  recontextualized,  and  therefore
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opposes  Saussure’s  structural  linguistics  and  his  conception  of  language  as  a  “code”  to
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intersubjectivity  (“un  apprentissage  et  un  exercice  permanent  de  réciprocité  et
d’intersubjectivité”) while playing down the uncontrollable undecidability attached to the use of
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natural science while understanding is the mode of intelligibility of human science. (Besides, the
term  derives  from  Hermes,  the  messenger-God  who  is  associated  with  the  function  of
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hermeneutic  theory  of  truth  as  “disclosure”  from  the  hermeneutic  theory  of  truth  as
“revelation”  while  insisting  on  the  way  the  two  theories  account  for  “interpretation  as
translation and not as intervention” (232-237).
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ABSTRACTS
Dans les nouvelles de Virginia Woolf,  l’utilisation presque obsédante du pronom « it » ouvre,
dans la surface trompeusement lisse et factuelle du texte, une brèche donnant accès à l’espace
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plus insondable de l’implicite :
‘What was the truth of it, John?’ asked Charles suddenly, turning and facing him. ‘What made you
give it up like that all in a second?’‘But I’ve not given it up,’ John replied. (“Solid Objects”)
‘Here we left it,’ she said. And he added,’ ‘Oh, but here too!’ ‘It’s upstairs,’ she murmured, ‘And in
the garden,’ he whispered. ‘Quietly,’ they said, ‘or we shall wake them.’ (“A Haunted House”)
Desiring truth, awaiting it, laboriously distilling a few words, for ever desiring — (“Monday or
Tuesday”)
But was it ‘happiness’? No. The big word did not seem to fit it, did not seem to refer to this state
of being curled in rosy flakes around a bright light. (“Happiness”)
Ce que « it » signifie dans les nouvelles de Virginia Woolf semble d’abord correspondre à l’objet
d’une  quête  acharnée :  celle  que  mènent,  au-delà  des  apparences,  des  faits  et  des  mots,
personnages et narrateurs. Mais au fur et à mesure que se dérobent la référence et le signifié du
pronom dans les labyrinthes de la métaphore apparaît l’impossibilité de la quête en même temps
que son illusoire intérêt herméneutique.
J’aimerais  tenter  d’analyser  ici  la  manière  dont  un  certain  nombre  d’outils  critiques  (ceux
proposés, entre autres, par la linguistique, la rhétorique et la pragmatique) nous aident à mieux
cerner la poétique Woolfienne de l’implicite.  Je formulerai ainsi l’hypothèse que ce que « it »
désigne est moins l’infinie réserve du sens littéraire que l’incontrôlable dimension implicite des
langues naturelles et de toute forme de communication.
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